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Abstract—In this paper, de-anonymizing internet users by
actively querying their group memberships in social networks
is considered. In this problem, an anonymous victim visits the
attacker’s website, and the attacker uses the victim’s browser
history to query her social media activity for the purpose of
de-anonymization using the minimum number of queries. A
stochastic model of the problem is considered where the attacker
has partial prior knowledge of the group membership graph and
receives noisy responses to its real-time queries. The victim’s
identity is assumed to be chosen randomly based on a given
distribution which models the users’ risk of visiting the mali-
cious website. A de-anonymization algorithm is proposed which
operates based on information thresholds and its performance
both in the finite and asymptotically large social network regimes
is analyzed. Furthermore, a converse result is provided which
proves the optimality of the proposed attack strategy.
I. Introduction
Preserving user privacy is a key obstacle to the continued
digitalization of the society. Consumers increasingly view the
ability to connect, communicate and collaborate over the inter-
net without risking their personal information as an absolute
necessity. Unfortunately, this is far from the case in practice.
For instance, websites track users to serve them with targeted
digital advertisements. More disturbingly, web tracking can
be used by state actors to stifle individuals’ free speech rights,
or target vulnerable minority groups. As a result, there is an
urgent need to understand and quantify web users’ privacy
risk, that is, what is the likelihood that users on the internet
can be uniquely identified using their online fingerprints?
A user’s fingerprint is the set of attributes that reflect the
user’s web activities: websites the user has visited and social
network groups that a user is a member of [1], [2], char-
acteristics of the user’s web browser (font size, for example)
[3], and physical device features [4]. Fingerprinting based de-
anonymization attacks build on the empirical observation that,
for a large enough set of attributes, a user’s fingerprints are
unique. The challenge, from an attacker’s standpoint, is that
an unknown user’s fingerprints may not be accurately or easily
available; i.e., fingerprints may be noisy and the attacker may
have to actively query user devices, one attribute at a time, to
measure their fingerprint. However, an attacker may only be
able to issue a limited number of queries to the user’s device.
Fig. 1: (Left) An example of a group membership bipartite
graph. (Right) A user is to be de-anonymized based on partial
fingerprints.
Recently, Wondracek et al. [5] proposed a practical finger-
printing attack strategy which uses the user’s social media
group memberships for the purposes of de-anonymization.
In this strategy, the attacker runs a malicious website and
seeks to de-anonymize users who visit the website. To this
end, the attacker first uses a web gather to scrape the group
memberships of users in the social network. This serves as
the attacker’s prior knowledge of the network which can be
represented as a bipartite graph. This is shown in the left
illustration in Figure 1. Note that the attacker’s scanned version
of the group membership graph might be different from the
actual network graph because of users’ privacy settings that
act as a source of noise.
When an unknown user visits the attacker’s website, the
attacker queries social network group memberships to find the
user’s identity. This is done by using browser history sniffing to
ask questions of the form “is the webpage of social network
group v in the user’s browser history?" If yes, the attacker
assumes that the user is a member of the social network group
v, and if no then the attacker assumes the user is not a member
of v. Of course, a user might be a member of a group they have
not visited, or conversely, might not be a member of a group
they have visited; consequently, the attacker’s measurement is
noisy. In this way, the attacker obtains the unknown user’s
partial fingerprint. This is shown in the right illustration in
Figure 1. By matching the partial fingerprint in the two graphs,
the unknown user is de-anonymized.
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Although effective, Wondracek et al.’s attack does not
answer fundamental questions about the optimal number and
type of group memberships to query, and the order in which
to issue queries. Other fingerprinting attacks proposed in
literature [5]–[10] have also adopted similar ad-hoc approaches
without theoretical guarantees or analyses.
In [11], we proposed a mathematical formulation for Won-
dracek et al.’s browser history sniffing attack [5], introduced
a new strategy by making analogies to channel coding, and
quantified the amount of information the attacker obtains from
each query. This formulation is summarized in Section II. We
showed that under the assumption that users are equally likely
to visit the attacker’s website, the total number of queries
required for de-anonymization grows logarithmically in the
number of users. Furthermore, the coefficient of the logarithm
is inversely proportional to the mutual information between
the random variables corresponding to the edges in the two
graphs in Figure 1.
In [11], we assumed that the victim’s index is distributed
uniformly over the set of all user indices. However, internet
users typically vary in terms of their activity levels on the
web. More active users would be more likely to visit an
attacker’s website, resulting in a non-uniform distribution on
the user index J. In this work, we propose an information-
threshold-based de-anonymization strategy which builds upon
the joint source-channel coding methods studied in [12]–
[14] to devise fingerprinting attacks when the user distribution
is not uniform. Roughly speaking, in the new strategy, the
attacker would query the selected anonymous user’s attributes
sequentially and calculate the amount of information obtained,
i.e. the amount of uncertainty regarding each user index
based on previous query responses. The attack ends when
the uncertainty is lower than a given threshold for one of the
user indices. In this strategy, the user distribution only affects
the initial information values. Furthermore, we provide a tight
converse which proves that the strategy is optimal in terms of
expected number of queries required for de-anonymization.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section
II, we provide the problem formulation. In Section III, we
introduce and analyze the new attack strategy. Section IV in-
cludes the converse result for active de-anonymization attacks.
Section V concludes the paper.
II. Problem Formulation
In this section, we provide a rigorous formulation of the
active fingerprinting problem. This is a generalization of the
formulation provided in [11]. We model the group member-
ships in the social network by a bipartite graph. The bigraph
is defined below:
Definition 1. An (n,m)-bigraph is a structure gn,m = (U,R,E),
where (U⋃R,E) is a graph such that |U| = n and |V| = m.
The set V = U⋃R is called the vertex set and is partitioned
into two subsets: 1) the user set U = {u1, u2, · · · , um}, and
2) the group set R = {r1, r2, · · · , rn}. The set E ⊆ {(i, j)|i ∈
[1,m], j ∈ [1, n]} is called the edge set.
Definition 2. Let gn,m be an (n,m)-bigraph characterized by
the triple (U,R,E), then,
• For a group r j, j ∈ [1, n], the set E j = {i|(i, j) ∈ E}, j ∈
[1, n] is called the set of members of r j.
• For a user ui, i ∈ [1,m], the set Fi = { j|(i, j) ∈ E}, i ∈
[1,m] is called the set of groups associated with ui.
• The group signature of user ui is the vector F i =
(Fi,1, Fi,2, · · · , Fi,n), where
Fi,k =
1 if ui ∈ Ek,0 otherwise.
• The vector Fn2i,n1 = (Fi,n1 , Fi,n1+1, · · · , Fi,n2 ) is called a
partial group signature of ui, where 1 ≤ n1 ≤ n2 ≤ n.
Definition 3. An (n,m, p)-random bigraph is a structure
gn,m,p = (U,R,E), such that i) gn,m = (U,R,E) is an (n,m)-
bigraph, and ii) The edge set E is generated randomly based
on the distribution:
P(E = E) = p|E|(1 − p)(nm−|E|),
where E ⊆ {(i, j)|i ∈ [1,m], j ∈ [1, n]}.
Definition 4. A correlated pair of random bigraphs (CPRB)
is a pair g
n,m,PE0 ,E1
= (g0n,m,p0 , g
1
n,m,p1 ), where i) g
i
n,m,pi , i ∈ {0, 1}
is an (n,m, pi)-random bigraph with P(Ei = 1) = pi, i ∈ {0, 1},
and ii) The edge sets Ei, i ∈ {0, 1} are generated based on the
joint probability distribution:
P
(
1(e0 ∈ E0) = α,1(e1 ∈ E1) = β)
)
=
PE0,E1 (α, β), if e0 = e1PE0 (α)PE1 (β), Otherwise
where α, β ∈ {0, 1}2, e1, e2 ∈ {(i, j)|i ∈ [1,m], j ∈ [1, n]}, and
1(·) is the indicator function.
The following defines an active de-anonymization problem:
Definition 5. An active de-anonymization problem is charac-
terized by the quadruple (g
n,m,PE0 ,E1
, PJ[m] , P
UID
Y |Z , P
GM
Y |Z ), where
g
n,m,PE0 ,E1
= (g0n,m,p0 , g
1
n,m,p1 ) is a CPRB, the random variable
J[m] is defined on the alphabet J[m] = [1,m], and the variables
Y and Z are binary random variables.
In the above definition, g0n,m,p0 represents the group mem-
bership graph and g1n,m,p1 represents the attacker’s scanned
graph. The random variable J[m] is the index of the user
uJ[m] which is to be de-anonymized. For brevity, we write
J instead of J[m] when there is no ambiguity. We assume a
memoryless and time-invariant stochastic noise model for the
responses to the attacker’s queries. The variable Z represents
the correct response to the attacker’s query, where Z = 1
indicates a ‘yes’ response, and the variable Y represents the
noisy response received by the attacker after making the query.
As explained in [11], the set of possible queries is divided
into two categories: i) User identity (UID): a UID query asks
if the unknown victim uJ is user u j in the network, and ii)
group Membership Queries (GM): a GM asks if the unknown
victim uJ is a member of the group ri. Hence, the conditional
distributions PUIDY |Z and P
GM
Y |Z are the distribution of the response
received by the attacker given the correct response to the
attacker’s UID and GM queries, respectively. Due to practical
considerations explained in [11], we assume that the responses
to the UID queries are received noiselessly (i.e. PUIDY |Z = I2,
where I2 is the unitary matrix). Loosely speaking, UID queries
provide information regarding a single user index whereas GM
queries provide information regarding all of the user indices
in the corresponding group. As a result, it is often desirable
to send GM queries when there is uncertainty among a large
subset of user indices and UID queries when it is verified that
the anonymous user is in a small subset of users. At time
t ∈ N, the attacker uses the vector of prior responses Y t−11 and
the scanned graph g1n,m,p1 to choose the next query xt. An attack
strategy provides the sequence of functions xt(Y t−11 , g
1
n,m,p1 ). If
the attacker sends the UID query corresponding to the user u j,
we write xt = u j, and if it sends the GM query corresponding
to the group ri, we write xt = ri.
Definition 6. An attack strategy χ for the active de-
anonymization problem (g
n,m,PE0 ,E1
, PJ , PUIDY |Z , P
GM
Y |Z ) is defined
as a sequence of functions xt : g1n,m,p1 ×{0, 1}(t−1) → R∪U, t ∈
N. The random process Zt, t ∈ N is defined as the sequence of
correct responses:
Zt =
1 if xt = ri & J ∈ E0ri or xt = uJ ,0 Otherwise.
The random process Yt, t ∈ N is the sequence of received
responses. The Markov chains Yt ↔ Zt ↔ xt,Y t−1,Zt−1, t ∈ N
hold. Furthermore,
PYt |Zt =
PUIDY |Z if xt ∈ UPGMY |Z if xt ∈ R .
Finally, the random process Ut, t ∈ N is the sequence of
expected responses based on the scanned graph g1n,m,p1 :
Ut =
1 if xt = ri & J ∈ E1ri or xt = uJ ,0 Otherwise.
The performance of an attack strategy is measured based
on the average number of queries required for successful de-
anonymization.
Definition 7. For a given attack strategy characterized by χ =
(xt(yt−11 ))t∈N, the number of queries required for successful de-
anonymization is defined as Q , min{t|(xt, yt) = (uJ , 1)}.
Definition 8. For the active de-anonymization problem
(g
n,m,PE0 ,E1
, PJ , PUIDY |Z , P
GM
Y |Z ), the minimum expected number of
queries is defined as:
Q¯ , min
xt :{0,1}(t−1)→R∪U,t∈N
E(Q),
where the expectations is over g
n,m,PE0 ,E1
, J and Yt,Zt, t ∈ N.
III. The Information Threshold Strategy
In [11], we considered the de-anonymization problem
under the assumption that the victim’s index J, is distributed
uniformly over the index set [1,m]. Here, we relax this
assumption and consider the problem when the victim’s index
is distributed according to an arbitrary probability distribution
PJ which is known a-priori to the attacker. This models the
varying levels of risk averseness and risk tolerance for users
over the network. More risk tolerant users are more likely to
visit an attacker’s website. Hence the corresponding user index
is more likely to be de-anonymized.
The information threshold strategy (ITS) is a de-
anonymization strategy which operates by comparing the
‘information value’ of each user index with an information
threshold. The information values represent the amount of
uncertainty in each user index given the received query re-
sponses. We provide bounds on the performance of the ITS
for arbitrary PGMY |X and PJ , and show that the expected number
of queries is proportional to the user index entropy H(J) and
is inversely proportional to the mutual information I(U; Y)
between the random variables corresponding to the received
and expected responses. When the index J is uniformly
distributed, the first order performance (i.e. the coefficient
of the logarithmic term for the expected number of queries)
of the ITS is the same as that of the typical set strategy
(TSS) in [11]. However, the ITS outperforms the TSS in the
second order sense in the expected number of queries (i.e. the
coefficient of the terms which are asymptotically smaller than
the logarithmic term is improved.). We proceed to describe the
strategy.
Definition 9. For the pair of random variables (X,Y) defined
on the probability space (X×Y, 2X×Y, PX,Y ), where X and Y
are finite sets, the information density is defined as:
iX;Y (x; y) = log
PY |X(y|x)
PY (y)
, ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y.
Let Ut,Yt and Zt be binary random processes defined in
Definition 6. Fix  > 0 and l ∈ N. Also, define the joint
distribution:
PU,Y,Z(u, y, z) , PZ(z)PE1 |E0 (u|z)PGMY |Z (y|z). (1)
At the initial stage, the attacker forms an m-length vector
of ‘information values’ corresponding to the vector of users
(ui)i∈[1,m]. The initial information value for user j ∈ [1,m] is
defined as:
I0( j) , log
1
PJ( j)
.
Once the vector of information values is formed, the attack
progresses in l steps. In each step, the attacker sends group
membership queries sequentially starting with the query cor-
responding to the first group r1, and proceeding by increasing
the group index. Hence, it makes queries regarding the values
of Zτ
∗
= (FJ,1, FJ,2, · · · , FJ,τ∗ ) defined in Definition 2, where
τ∗ is defined later. The attacker receives the noisy sequence
of responses (Y1,Y2, · · · ,Yτ∗ ). The information value query
number n′ is defined below:
In′ ( j) = iUn′ ;Yn′ (U
n′ ,Yn
′
) − I0( j), j ∈ [1,m], n′ ∈ [1, τ∗],
GM queries are concluded if there exists at least one index j
for which the information value Iτ∗ ( j) is larger than the infor-
mation threshold log 1

. More precisely, the attacker defines
τ j = min{n′ ≥ 0 : In′ ( j) ≥ log 1

}, j ∈ [1,m],
and the stopping time τ∗ = min j∈[1,m] τ j. The attacker then
finds the user with the maximum information value:
Ĵ = argmax j∈[1,m]Iτ∗ ( j).
Next, the attacker sends a UID query to verify that the user
index is equal to Ĵ. In other words, it transmits xτ∗+1 = uĴ .
The algorithms ends if the output yτ∗+1 = 1 is received. If the
attacker fails to recover J in this step, it proceeds to the next
step. In summary, the attack strategy in the first step is given
below:
xt =
rt if t ≤ τ∗,uiĴ if t = τ∗ + 1.
If the UID returns a negative response, in the next step, the
attacker resets the information values to their initial values.
It repeats the previous step for the next set of group indices.
If the attack strategy reaches the lth step, all of the possible
UID’s are sent for all remaining users until the user is de-
anonymized. The number of steps ‘l′ is chosen such that the
probability of reaching the lth step is small enough.
We denote the number of queries in this attack strategy by
QITS . The following theorem provides bounds on the expected
number of queries:
Theorem 1. For the ITS strategy:
E(QITS ) ≤ 1(1 − )
H(J) + log 1 + imaxI(U; Y) + 1
 + m2  l, (2)
where imax , maxu,y iU;Y (u; y), and PU,Y is defined in equation
(1), provided that the number of groups ‘n’ satisfies
1
(1 − ) l
H(J) + log 1 + imaxI(U; Y) + 1
 < n. (3)
Particularly, if  = log log mlog m , and l ,
log m
log log m−log log log m , then the
inequality
E(QITS ) ≤ H(J[m])I(U; Y) + O(log log m) (4)
holds, provided that
H(J[m])
I(U; Y)
log log m < n. (5)
Proof. Please refer to the appendix. 
Remark 1. In Theorem 1, we have assumed that the number
of groups n satisfies:
1
(1 − )
H(J) + log 1 + imaxI(U; Y) + 1
 + m2  l < n.
IV. Converse Theorems for Active De-anonymization
In this section, we prove that the bound provided in The-
orem 1 is tight in the first order sense (i.e. the coefficient
of H(J) in Equation (4) cannot be improved.). To this end,
we build upon the converse of Burnashev’s reliability function
for point-to-point communication over channels with noiseless
feedback [12], [13], [15]. More specifically, for a given
active de-anonymization strategy, we introduce a dual code
for communication over a channel with feedback, and use the
converse results in [12], [13], [15] to provide bounds on the
optimal performance. In our analogy, the victim’s index in the
fingerprinting problem is analogous to the message which is
to be sent over the channel with feedback and the queries are
analogous to the channel inputs. The following provides the
standard definition for a variable length code for a discrete
memoryless channel with feedback.
Definition 10. A (T, )-variable length code for the channel
with feedback (U,Y, PY |U) transmitting message J (with al-
phabet J) is defined by: i) the common information V ∈ V
shared between the encoder and decoder prior to the start
of the communication, ii) a sequence of encoding functions
Un : V × J × Yn−1 7→ U, n ∈ N, iii) a sequence of decoding
functions Ĵn : V × Yn 7→ J , and iv) a non-negative integer-
valued random variable τ.
The reconstruction of the message at the decoder is given
by Ĵ = Ĵτ(V,Yτ). The average transmission time for a given
code is defined as T = E(τ). The probability of error for the
code is  = P(Ĵ , J).
We use the following result:
Lemma 1. [12] The average transmission time for a family
of (Tn, n)-variable length block codes for the channel with
noiseless feedback (U,Y, PY |U) is lower-bounded by:
Tn ≥ H(J)I(U; Y) + O(n),
where n → 0 as n→ ∞.
The following provides a converse for the performance of
active de-anonymization strategies:
Theorem 2. Let (g
nt ,mt ,PE0 ,E1
, PJ[mt ] , P
UID
Y |Z , P
GM
Y |Z ), t ∈ N be a
sequence of active de-anonymization problems where mt → ∞
as t → ∞ and nt is an arbitrary sequence. Consider the
sequence of attack strategies χt, t ∈ N. Define Q¯χt as the
expected number of queries for successful de-anonymization
for the strategy χt. Then,
Q¯χt ≥ H(J[mt])I(U; Y) + O(log mt).
Proof. Please refer to the Appendix.

V. Conclusion
We have studied the active de-anonymization problem for
general non-equiprobable user indices. We have introduced
the ITS de-anonymization strategy which operates based on
information thresholds. The new strategy measures the amount
of uncertainty in the user indices given the received query
responses. We have characterized the performance of the ITS
both for social networks with a fixed, finite number of users
as well as for asymptotically large social networks. Finally,
we have provided a converse which shows the first-order
optimality of the proposed approach.
Appendix
A. Proof of Theorem 1
The proof builds upon the method in [12]. Fix  > 0 and
l ∈ N. Let τ j, τ∗, and Ĵ be defined as in Section III. Let
Ei, i ∈ [1, l − 1] be the event that Ĵ is equal to the victim’s
index J in the ith step. We have the following:
E (QITS ) =
P (E1)E (QITS |E1) + P
(
Ec1
⋂
E2
)
E
(
QITS |Ec1
⋂
E2
)
+ · · ·
+ P
 l−2⋂
i=1
Eci
⋂
El−1
E
QITS | l−2⋂
i=1
Eci
⋂
El−1
 + P
 l⋂
i=1
Eci
 · m2
= P (E1) (E(τ∗) + 1) + P
(
Ec1
⋂
E2
)
(2E(τ∗) + 2) + · · ·
+ P
 l−2⋂
i=1
Eci
⋂
El−1
 ((l − 1)E(τ∗) + l − 1) + P
 l⋂
i=1
Eci
 · m2
(a)
=
l−1∑
i=1
i (1 − )  i−1 (E (τ∗) + 1) + m
2
 l−1
=
1
(1 − ) (E (τ
∗) + 1) +
m
2
 l−1, (6)
where (a) follows from the fact that the events Ei are mutually
independent and equiprobable with P(Ei) = 1− , i ∈ [1, l− 1].
Next, we derive an upper-bound for E(τ∗).
Proposition 1. The following bound on the expectation of τ∗
holds:
E(τ∗) ≤ H(J) + log
1

+ imax
I(U; Y)
.
Proof. First, note that E(τ∗) ≤ E(τJ) by definition of τ∗. So, it
is enough to prove the upper bound on E(τJ). Fix j ∈ N. Let
t = min{τJ , j}. Note that:
E (It (J)) = E
(
iU t ;Y t
(
U t; Y t
))
− Io( j)
(a)
= E
 t∑
j=1
iU;Y
(
U j; Y j
) − H (J)
(b)
= I(U; Y)E(t) − H(J),
where in (a) we have used the memoryless property of the
network and (b) follows from the smoothing property of
expectation and the fact that iU;Y (U; Y) is constant in j. Also,
note that It(J) is an increasing function of t and at each step
the increment is less than or equal to imax. It follows that:
E (It (J)) ≤ E (It−1 (J)) + imax ≤ log 1

+ imax,
where we have used the fact that iU;Y (u, y) ≤ imax,∀u, y ∈
U×Y and that by the definition of τJ , we have It−1(J) ≤ log 1
since t − 1 < τJ . So, far we have shown that I(U; Y)E(t) −
H(J) ≤ log 1

+ imax,∀ j ∈ N. By the monotone convergence
theorem it follows that I(U; Y)E(τJ) − H(J) ≤ log 1 + imax.
This completes the proof of the proposition. 
Applying the above proposition to Equation (6) gives:
E (QITS ) ≤ 1(1 − )
H (J) + log 1 + imaxI (U; Y) + 1
 + m2  l−1.
Take  = log log mlog m , and l =
log m
log log m−log log log m , then
E (QITS ) ≤ H (J)I (U; Y) + O
(
log log m
)
.
The bounds in (3) and (5) follow from the fact that from the
Markov inequality, P(τ∗ > E(τ
∗)
 l
) ≤  l. This completes the proof
of Theorem 1.
B. Proof of Theorem 2
We provide an outline of the proof. For the given attack
strategy χn = (Xt)t∈N, we define the dual code for communica-
tion over the channel with feedback (U,Y, PY |U) which trans-
mits the message J[m] as follows. At time t, assume that the
sequence Y t−1 is noiselessly available at the transmitter through
feedback. The encoder first calculates the query Xt(Y t−1) given
the the attack strategy χn when the attacker is to de-anonymize
the user index J[m]. If Xt is a GM query corresponding to
the group rt, then Ut = 1(uJ[m] ∈ rt) is transmitted as the
channel input. If Xt is a UID query corresponding to the user
uĴ[m] , then the transmitter uses a repetition code as described
next. If J[m] = Ĵ[m], the all-ones sequence of length trep is
transmitted, and if J[m] , Ĵ[m], the all-zeros sequence of
length trep is transmitted, where trep will be determined later.
The decoder uses a majority logic decoder for the repetition
code to determine whether the response to the UID query is
positive or not. By construction, the probability of error of
this sequence of codes m is proportional to the probability of
error of the repetition code since if the response to the UID
query is positive and correctly decoded, then the transmission
is succsessful. Hence, the probability of error approaches 0
as m → ∞ if trep = ω(log ( 1m )). Let Tm be the expected
transmission time for this code. The statement of theorem
follows from Lemma 1 by taking m = ω( 1m ):
Q¯χn ≥ Tm + Θ(trep) ≥ H(J)I(U; Y) + O(log m).
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